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Secrecy, Sacrifice, and God on the Island: 
Christianity and Colonialism in Coetzee’s Foe
and Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe
Jay Rajiva
J. M. Coetzee’s novel Foe begins with a shipwreck and ends with a 
confrontation underwater, as an unnamed, previously unvoiced narrator 
encounters Friday in a place “where bodies are their own signs” and each 
spoken word “is caught and filled with water and diffused” (Coetzee 
1986, 157).1 In this confrontation, Coetzee also withholds Friday from 
the reader’s understanding, securing his body, as Gayatri Spivak notes, 
in “the real margin that has been haunting the text since its first page” 
(1999, 186). Thus Friday gestures only as that which will always keep its 
silence within the dominant colonial and historical register: we never 
receive any specific indication of what Friday might be, except a symbol 
of the breakdown of meaning. Friday is mute, intractable, mysterious, yet 
linked to the inexpressible “sounds of the island” (F 154). I argue that the 
tension in Coetzee’s repetition of Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe springs 
from the exposure of the Christian secret in both the colonial enterprises 
of the characters and the authorial presences of Defoe and Coetzee. My 
argument draws on Jacques Derrida’s characterization of Christianity 
in The Gift of Death, which outlines how Christianity incorporates (but 
does not destroy) older, non-Christian elements into its own epistemic 
framework without acknowledging this act of incorporation. In Defoe’s 
novel, Crusoe, the white colonial explorer, explicitly sets out to convert 
Friday to Christianity and succeeds in that goal through the triumph of 
Christian tenets: devotion to God requires the keeping of an absolute 
secret, a willingness to sacrifice, and prostration before the gaze of God, 
at whom, because God is always what exceeds one’s understanding, one 
can never gaze back. Friday and Crusoe’s discussion about the worship 
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of God offers a startling if inadvertent subversion of the Christian 
subject position in Defoe’s novel. And the nonpresence of Friday in Foe 
widens this subversion, revealing the work of colonial Christianity as 
still in transition, convulsed by the repetition of what it is attempting to 
subordinate in secret: the non-Christian other whose sacrifice cannot be 
openly acknowledged. I suggest that what Foe accomplishes, as a literary 
response to Robinson Crusoe, is to expose this secret as secret, to lay bare 
the religious economy of sacrifice on which the colonial enterprise has 
historically rested.
 The vexed relationship of Foe to the ethics of representation has been 
well-documented. For Michael Marais, “Cruso’s authorial imperialism . . . 
is informed by the hermeneutic urge to domesticate both Friday and 
the alien landscape of the island by integrating both into a European 
system of recognition” (1996, 69), while Teresa Dovey observes that in 
Foe “the colonised subject has no discursive authority within the field 
of western discourses” (1998, 26). Derek Attridge (2004) writes of the 
relationship between Derridean ethics and Coetzee’s fiction in terms 
of his commitment to the radical alterity of the other’s voice, both as 
a textual impossibility and as the precondition for any kind of ethical 
exchange. Spivak, in her turn, focuses on the implication of  Western 
feminism in the capitalist-driven colonial framework within which Friday 
is “the unemphatic agent of withholding in the text” (1999, 190). Valuable 
as these readings are, they tend to treat Christianity as the historical 
accompaniment to the novel’s representation of colonialism, rather than 
as a vital part of how the process of colonial incorporation is staged. 
What this essay will demonstrate is the way Foe uses the mechanics of 
stalled repetition and secrecy to characterize colonialism as a hegemonic 
framework both constituted by and constitutive of Christian ethics. In 
Doubling the Point, Coetzee is clearly uncomfortable with David Attwell’s 
suggestion that his writing has moved closer to an implicitly Christian 
notion of grace: “As for grace, no, regrettably no: I am not a Christian, 
or not yet” (Coetzee 1992a, 250). Even so, as Patrick Hayes has noted, 
Coetzee does seem concerned with “a debate of fundamental importance 
between ‘cynicism’ and ‘grace,’” where cynicism is “the denial of any 
ultimate base for values” and grace is “a condition in which truth can 
be told clearly, without blindness” (2006, 275). Indeed, Hayes locates the 
turn from cynicism to grace as a watershed moment for Coetzee, whose 
later work (notably Age of Iron [1990], The Master of Petersburg [1994], and 
Disgrace [1999]) pits the endlessly self-serving individuality of cynicism 
against the struggle, however blind or obdurate, for some notion of earthly 
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salvation.2  Within this framework, Friday’s body, like the “earlier” version 
of Defoe’s Friday, becomes visible as the implicit target of conversion; as 
it becomes visible, it allows the novel to expose exploitation as the heart 
of a specifically Christian colonial project.
 Linda Hutcheon (1988) has characterized Foe as an example of 
historiographic metafiction: postmodern writing that interfaces with and 
contests specific historical moments within an intensely self-reflexive 
formal framework, calling attention to the fissures and instabilities 
of history as a branch of knowledge.3 Historiographic metafiction, 
Hutcheon argues, “rejects projecting present beliefs and standards onto 
the past and asserts, in strong terms, the specificity and particularity of 
the individual past event,” acknowledging “that we are epistemologically 
limited in our ability to know the past, since we are both spectators of 
and actors in the historical process” (1988, 122). Historical details are thus 
frequently “falsified in order to foreground the possible mnemonic failures 
of recorded history,” thereby dramatizing the “process of attempting to 
assimilate” (114) rather than focusing on the end result. Drawing on 
Hutcheon, I extend the critical discussion of Coetzee’s oeuvre by locating 
in Foe a structural relation to Derrida, one that attends to the relationship 
between the assimilative process of Christian conversion and the ethics of 
narrative. In recasting Defoe’s story of the colonial explorer as anticolonial 
metafiction, I argue that Foe creates a tacit but insistent Christian subtext 
of failed repetition that binds the two stories together. Within a Derridean 
framework, imaginative repetition in the novel discloses itself as a task 
beset by failures it can never acknowledge in a Christian context. In 
enacting these failures of repetition, Foe dramatizes the epistemic limit 
of the colonist as a specifically Christian limit, illustrating the extent to 
which each framework subtends and informs the other.
Repetition and incorporation
My readings of Robinson Crusoe and Foe depend upon Derrida’s exegesis 
of the development of Christianity in The Gift of Death. There Derrida 
consolidates this development into three sequential phases: demonic 
(orgiastic) irresponsibility, Platonic (ethical) responsibility, and, finally, 
Christian conscience or the mysterium tremendum (trembling mystery). 
The origin of the demonic lies precisely in the absence of responsibility: 
one has no obligation to respond to the other, to seek recognition in the 
face of the other, or to justify oneself before another, free to satisfy an 
internal drive that envelops one in interiority. The demonic thus involves 
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secrecy, disdaining to elaborate or disclose itself. Identifying the demonic 
as that which “crosses the boundaries separating the human, the animal, 
and the divine” (1995, 3), Derrida discusses the attempt to historicize 
this question of secrecy in relation to the birth of  “modern” Europe. We 
can thus make the tacit link from the demonic to paganism, mysticism, 
totemism, and cannibalism: to everything beyond the pale of Christianity 
at its formation.
 Plato attempts to break with demonic secrecy by turning the self away 
from irresponsibility toward “the Good and the intelligible sun, out of the 
cavern” (7), forsaking the dark secrecy of the cavern for the sunlight of 
full disclosure. However, in rendering this turn as progress toward a “new 
mystery of the soul,” and in ignoring its specific historical (European) 
context, Platonic responsibility never truly breaks with demonic mystery; 
rather, it holds it in hiding, asking us to keep two secrets, two mysteries 
of erasure (8). Though Derrida does not stress the point, to my mind 
this passage from demonic to Platonic is a re-creation: the demonic 
is not destroyed but instead persists in the form of a repetition whose 
disembodied possibility sets the ethical limit for the Platonic subject.
 In the final phase, Platonic responsibility gives way to a Christianity 
that supplants the light of the Good with that of God, binding one 
to a relation with a wholly other whose gaze penetrates to one’s very 
soul. God demands that one give everything to him without knowing 
in advance what the result may be; one’s sense of responsibility is now 
permanently lodged in a devotion to God. But in order to elevate “the 
natural foundation” (Derrida 1995, 24) of Christian theology, this passage 
into Christianity surreptitiously relies on Platonic rationalism, thereby de-
prioritizing responsibility in and of itself. Furthermore, while responsibility 
of necessity must entail a recognition of what it means to be responsible, 
this responsibility is, according to Derrida, never sufficiently theorized 
in Christian theology. We are left, that is, with an irresponsible (because 
incomplete) definition of responsibility, which remains opaque and thus 
maintains a tacit connection to the irresponsibility of demonic mystery: 
another repetition and another secret.
 Just as this tacit connection inhabits Christian theology, it has rami-
fications for attempts to work through Christian origins in the ethical 
register. In Moses and Monotheism, Freud characterizes the association of 
the demonic with the pagan (non-Christian) as a teleology: totemism, 
the mystical worship of and identification with a strong animal, gives 
way to cannibalism, as the strong sons kill and devour the father, in turn 
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acceding to the worship of human gods, as polytheism, and finally to 
monotheism in the forms of Judaism and, subsequently, Christianity.4  That 
Freud acknowledges he has little or no historical basis for this formulation 
dovetails with Derrida’s positing of this tradition as specifically European: 
the non-European other becomes the locus of that which exceeds the 
parameters of  Western psychoanalytic discourse. Freud’s dismissal of 
the need for evidence, or for logic, demonstrates the construction of 
the European Christian self as a process whose urgency overrides the 
historical specificity of what it is attempting to contain and sublate. 
Talal Asad sees the development of modern Christian doctrine, for 
example, as tacitly relying on Enlightenment reason, which creates issues 
of  “translation” when Western anthropologists attempt to study non-
Christian religions such as Islam (1993, 2). Such quandaries call attention 
to the forms that disavowed repetition (incorporation) can take even 
within disciplines such as psychoanalysis, anthropology, and philosophy 
that seek to account for the givenness of origins.
 For Derrida, Christianity is driven to incorporate the demonic and 
the Platonic into itself and then to erase all traces of that process. In this, 
he himself partly repeats Asad’s interrogation of Christianity’s turn toward 
secrecy and interiority, which, for Asad, is the Kantian “construction of 
[Christianity] as a new historical object: anchored in personal experience, 
expressible as belief-statements, dependent on private institutions, and 
practiced in one’s spare time” (1993, 207). However, the incorporated 
trace is, for Derrida, always visible by virtue of the contradictions and 
slippages by which the older systems of knowledge are subsumed. 
Literature, in its turn, dramatizes the difficulty by which branches of 
knowledge negotiate the givenness of their own founding principles. 
To the extent that Foe is an intertextual repetition of Robinson Crusoe, 
both works represent a silence: requiring nonreciprocal sacrifice to God, 
faith is irreducibly secret and never open to repetition, but the hidden 
incorporation of older demonic and Platonic elements becomes a stalled 
repetition that haunts the problem of conceiving ethical responsibility to 
the human. Foe, I argue, exposes the incorporative process by linking the 
colonial project to a historically contingent Christianity. I will stage this 
argument by examining the conversion of Friday in both Robinson Crusoe 
and Foe, characterizing him as the element that resists “proper” integration 
into the European ethico-religious system of both novels. Friday’s refusal 
to be legibly coded is not merely a refusal of colonial hegemony but a 
challenge to the Christian ethic of asymmetrical and secret sacrifice.
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In Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, the connection between intratextual repetition 
and the disavowed repetition within Christianity emerges in Crusoe’s 
failure to acknowledge the symbolic and moral significance of the events 
leading up to his shipwreck on the island. Twice over or more, Crusoe is 
shipwrecked, repents, ignores the signs of fate, suffers a setback due to a 
violent and unexpected storm, debates over whether to kill a cannibal (or 
cannibals), and quells all doubt with the pleasures of the flesh. He rejects 
his father’s warning that he will suffer the same fate as his older brother5 
if he ventures into “miseries which Nature and the station of life [he] was 
born in seemed to have provided against” (RC 3).6 He boards the ship 
that eventually shipwrecks on the island on the same day he first sets out 
from his parents’ home, finds the same barley growing on the island as in 
England, and even re-narrates the events of his shipwreck in his journal. 
At first, as in the instances above, Crusoe spurns any inclination toward 
the Christian devotion that eludes mortal understanding, in favor of either 
rationalism (the barley had been accidentally cast ashore from the ship-
wreck) or irresponsibility (banishing his hesitation through drink). At this 
point, he is “thoughtless of a God or a Providence,” acting “like a brute 
from the principles of Nature” (68). It is only with the onset of illness, 
imposing on him solitary reflection, that he is prompted to recognize that 
Providence “knows that I am here, and am in this dreadful condition” 
(70). Through this recognition, Crusoe gradually becomes secure in his 
faith, not merely resigning himself to God’s will in his continued isolation 
on the island but “even to a sincere thankfulness” (101) for that isolation.
 However, Crusoe’s discovery of Friday on the island opens up a space 
of tension through a remarkable exchange between them about religion, 
God, and the devil, in the context of Crusoe’s attempt to convert Friday 
to Christianity. I am not particularly concerned with treating Crusoe 
as an exemplar of formal realism’s encapsulation of the individual,7 
nor do I wish to discuss the impact of  “colonial setting” on “Crusoe’s 
individualism  .  .  .  in a world in which he is surrounded by religious 
and cultural Others” (Mcinelly 2003, 2). I want to read this attempt in 
order to illustrate how Defoe’s text creates the discursive possibility of 
resistance within Christianity’s very terms, setting the stage for Coetzee’s 
Foe to critique the incorporative, interpenetrating processes of both 
colonialism and Christianity. Initially, Crusoe strives to distinguish God 
from Benamuckee, but he is forced into a tautology: worship God because 
he is superior, but he is superior only because Crusoe compels Friday 
to worship him. Musing that “the policy of making a secret religion in 
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order to preserve the veneration of the people” can perhaps be found 
in “all religions in the world” (RC 166), Crusoe, despite his intentions, 
exposes the constructedness of Christianity’s claim to colonial authority: 
the secrecy of one’s connection to God is by definition unverifiable and 
is the basis for any religion, not merely for Christianity. As quickly as he 
introduces this possibility, however, Crusoe drops it, insisting on a spatio-
ethical contrast between Benamuckee, who can only be worshipped on 
mountaintops, and God, who is able to receive prayers from anywhere, in 
secret, in one’s own heart (evidenced by Crusoe’s many private “conversa-
tions” with God before he encounters Friday). While the pagan god is 
spatially bound, the Christian God is unseen but omnipresent, and when 
Friday reveals that Benamuckee’s priests communicate his word to the 
people, Crusoe denounces their behavior as a “fraud” and a “cheat” (167). 
God becomes the foundation of natural law, a rational a priori demanding 
responsibility even as it obscures the origins of such a demand. 
 The arbitrariness of such origins nonetheless emerges, however, in 
Crusoe’s discussion of the devil: “I entered into a long discourse with him 
about the devil .  .  . his setting himself up in the dark parts of the world 
to be worshipped instead of God, and as God, and the many stratagems 
he made use of to delude mankind to their ruin; how he had a secret 
access to our passions and to our affections; to adapt his snares so to our 
temptations.” Now it is the devil who works in “secret.” If the devil has 
“secret access” to innermost souls, however, what prevents him from being 
God in another guise? What distinguishes God from the devil? Against his 
aims, Crusoe has thus positioned the devil as an imaginative repetition of 
God, and himself (the voice of another) as the messenger of a God who 
may be the devil. Arguing that Defoe stages these conversion scenes to 
demonstrate “the need for evangelism of a fairly sophisticated kind” in 
order to recruit converts to Christianity, Timothy Blackburn illustrates 
the tendency in Defoe scholarship to instrumentalize Friday’s conversion, 
showing how the uncertainty of the Christian ethic is quickly subsumed 
to the exigencies of colonialism (1985, 373).8 In other words, while 
Crusoe may well need a more “sophisticated” theoretical framework in 
order to be more convincing as a missionary, his failure here also opens up 
a space of anticolonial resistance for Friday that the novel cannot resolve 
except by ad hoc closure.
 Faced with a colonial subject who will not readily keep the secret 
by accepting God as the foundation of natural law, Crusoe speaks an 
original repetition by which he is the messenger of God but also, like 
Benamuckee’s priests as he understands them, the emissary of the devil. 
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Such unstable speech, born of the other’s refusal to accept the givenness 
of Christianity, evokes Derrida’s critique of Austinian speech act theory: 
“Does the quality of risk,” he asks, “surround language like a kind of ditch 
or external place of perdition which speech could never hope to leave, 
but which it can escape by remaining ‘at home,’ by and in itself, in the 
shelter of its essence or telos?” (1988, 17). For Derrida, there is no staying 
“at home” for language, because establishing that prior place of safety is 
itself of necessity a linguistic process. The condition of undecidability, 
once acknowledged, is not easily dispensed with, as Friday, when told that 
God is undoubtedly stronger than the devil, wonders why God does not 
simply kill the devil and be done with the matter. To this Crusoe has no 
response except the hasty temporization that God will eventually punish 
the devil, which rather than settling the question simply prompts Friday 
to renew it, as he reasonably then wonders why God does not strike the 
devil down right now, before he can do any more harm. Crusoe finally 
asserts that God gives all beings, even the devil, time in which to repent 
and be forgiven, to which Friday, in a masterful counterstroke, replies: 
“That well; so you, I, devil, all wicked, all preserve, repent, God pardon 
all” (RC 168). Friday has thus exposed the contradiction in Christian 
moral law, that God and the devil, ostensibly opposed beings, are revealed 
as fundamentally similar, both seeing the subject in secret without 
themselves being seen, and Crusoe is confronted with that contradiction, 
the secret of his Christian premises now laid bare.
 In Robinson Crusoe, God cannot tolerate repetition—any exposure 
of the historical continuity with the figuration of the devil (demonic 
mystery) or of the tautology of natural law, positing a thing that we 
can know in the first instance, objectively, before anything else is given 
(Platonic responsibility). Moreover, any symmetrical “form of reciprocity” 
between the Christian subject and God must give way to asymmetrical 
devotion (Derrida 1995, 101), which then secretly effaces the moment 
of its own inception. God is all-seeing and immortal, yet I am not; he 
sees me but I cannot see him; the devil, who is not God, can see me in 
secret like God but can repent just as I can; all-powerful God cannot 
slay the devil. God must dissolve reciprocity in secret, and Friday’s crime 
is speaking the secret aloud, and thus Defoe’s literary mobilization of 
Christian doctrine is fatal to the integrity of that doctrine. To repair the 
situation, Crusoe sends Friday away while he prays to God for a means 
of convincing Friday to worship Christ, but, strangely, Defoe never 
represents Friday’s passage from nonbelief to belief  “on-stage,” nor does 
Friday provide much input during his conversion. Presumably, Friday has 
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been left to discover his own trembling secret, to develop his soul in an 
encounter with God, who sees without being seen, in secret from Crusoe. 
But just as the novel fails to represent the moment of conversion itself, it 
also fails to consolidate Crusoe’s authority as both narrator and Christian 
colonizer.9  This lacuna is partly attributable to the epistolary format in 
which Crusoe’s thoughts are rendered after the shipwreck. However, 
the fact that Crusoe’s own moral and religious doubts find concrete 
expression in his diary itself draws attention to Friday’s absence: without 
the explicit benefit of intellectual struggle, Friday has arguably become 
a “better” Christian than Crusoe himself. On first glance, this absence 
of interiority is perfectly consonant with the colonial project, readable 
as a Deleuzian “mechanical” repetition of the original white, Christian 
explorer, absent any sustained intellectual inquiry. However, the net result 
of this absence is to leave the reader with a far more vivid impression 
of the astonishing challenge that Defoe has permitted Friday to mount 
against the moral and natural legitimacy of Christianity, a challenge that 
puts Christianity into interpenetrative dialogue with colonialism as an 
economic framework driven by self-interested necessity. The narrative is 
unable to accommodate the plenitude of Friday’s religious conversion, 
dramatizing the gap between his intellectual rigor, prior to his conversion, 
and the “reformed” subject whose ability to engage the topic of religious 
faith has vanished as the direct result of narrative and, thus, colonial 
necessity. In other words, the text is obliged to make Friday’s religious 
conversion a narrative fait accompli to serve the needs of colonialism.
The secret of sacrifice
Taking Defoe’s novel on its own, one might be forgiven for reducing 
Friday’s queries to nothing but the detritus of a prelapsarian ontology 
whose naïveté is happily and organically consumed by Christian theology. 
Considering the novel together with Coetzee’s Foe, however, complicates 
our understanding of these queries. Where Defoe’s Crusoe uses a journal 
to narrate his stay on the island in exhaustive detail, Coetzee’s Cruso 
scorns the written word in favor of his own memory, displaying almost 
nothing of the explicitly Christian devotion that saturates Robinson 
Crusoe’s account of his life and times on and off the island:
“If Providence were to watch over us,” said Cruso, “who would 
be left to pick the cotton and cut the sugar-cane? For the 
business of the world to prosper, Providence must sometimes 
wake and sometimes sleep, as lower creatures do.” He saw that I 
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shook my head, so went on. “You think I mock Providence. But 
perhaps it is the doing of Providence that Friday finds himself on 
an island under a lenient master, rather than in Brazil, under the 
planter’s lash, or in Africa, where the forests teem with cannibals. 
Perhaps it is for the best, though we do not see it so, that he 
should be here.”     (F 23–24)
This critique of Christian divinity is a far cry from Defoe’s Crusoe, who 
insistently places Providence as not only beyond human understanding 
but also as ceaselessly and actively concerned with human affairs.10 
Instead, Coetzee’s Cruso willingly compares God to lower creatures, 
creating an insupportable repetition in Christian thought, which amounts 
to a heresy. Christianity is deeply implicated in the system of production 
whereby Friday, “a slave and then a castaway,” has, in Susan Barton’s 
words, been stripped “of his childhood and consigned to silence” (F 23). 
If Cruso believes that Providence must slumber in order for the “business 
of the world to prosper,” such a disavowal registers the hypocrisy of 
religious conversion, since it is precisely Robinson Crusoe’s missionary 
zeal that converts Friday into a docile body within a capitalist framework; 
the image evokes the eighteenth-century plantation economies of 
the Caribbean, largely driven by the production of sugar and cotton. 
Coetzee’s Cruso frames Providence as necessarily favoring some people 
over others, casually noting that Friday’s subordinate status on the island 
is preferable to “the planter’s lash” in Brazil or the supposed “cannibals” 
of an undifferentiated Africa. The latter image, of course, anticipates 
the Friday of Robinson Crusoe, who openly participates in a culture of 
cannibalism; to Crusoe’s queries he responds: “Yes, my nation eat mans 
too; eats all up” (RC 164). Coetzee tethers the investigation into Friday’s 
silence specifically to a moment when the extent of divine (Christian) 
influence is under intense scrutiny; having previously considered Friday 
“in all matters a dull fellow,” giving him “little more attention than [she] 
would have given any house-slave in Brazil,” Barton’s response to Friday 
evolves into “the horror we reserve for the mutilated” (F 24). Yet this 
evocation of an untold story is itself the product of a story that Robinson 
Crusoe must also, in its turn, leave untold: the mutual constitutive relation-
ship of Christianity and colonial hegemony. 
 In this passage on Providence, we can perceive a Crusoe “in waiting,” 
the colonial explorer of Defoe’s novel who will eventually subdue and 
convert Friday to Christianity. However, Coetzee’s novel suspends the 
advent of this figure by keeping two issues at the forefront of the narrative: 
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the duty toward individuals such as Friday, and the mystery of his missing 
tongue. The question of duty gestures to ethical responsibility in the 
Platonic, rational sense, while the missing tongue testifies to demonic 
irresponsibility, without endings or beginnings. Only by incorporating 
(in the Derridean sense elaborated above) these issues into a Christian 
notion of ethics can Defoe’s Crusoe come into being as a legitimate 
representative of colonial authority. Rather than a disinterested, inconstant 
presence who “must sometimes wake and sometimes sleep,” Providence 
in Robinson Crusoe is a God who watches everything in secret, holding 
the subject in the trembling terror of the gaze that the subject can never 
confront eye to eye. In Foe, by contrast, the circuit of incorporation is 
revealed and, by that revelation, disrupted.
 If God cannot tolerate repetition of himself, how does sacrifice 
replace that repetition with ontological certainty? Through the abjection 
of accepting sacrifice’s necessity. Derrida takes up the biblical problem 
of God’s demanding Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac, without God’s 
providing any justification for the demand. At the scene of what he 
thinks will be an animal sacrifice, Isaac wonders where they will find a 
sacrificial lamb, and Abraham replies, “God will provide a lamb” (Derrida 
1995, 59). Though he does not lie, as Derrida notes, he keeps a secret by 
saying nothing in his response about God’s demand, and thus “transgresses 
the ethical order.” Isaac’s deliverance comes precisely when Abraham 
has mentally given over his son to sacrifice: in the moment when he 
acquiesces in thought to killing the son he loves, forsaking the ethical 
relation to his family for the absolute interiority of the secret fulfillment 
of God’s wish, God relents and spares Isaac’s life. Abraham’s sacrifice of 
his son in thought is the repetition that both anticipates and negates its 
material enactment. In accepting the thought of killing his son, Abraham 
anticipates the actual moment when it will happen, but this willingness 
to commit mental filicide is exactly what prompts God to spare Isaac’s 
life. To be ethical, to refuse to kill his son even in thought, would render 
the Christian subject irresponsible to God.
 It is not accidental that in instructing Friday on the teachings of 
Christianity, Defoe’s Crusoe mentions that “our blessed Redeemer took 
not on Him the nature of angels, but the seed of Abraham” (RC 168), 
prefiguring a later scene in which Friday, thinking that Crusoe means 
to send him back to his own people, asks Crusoe to kill him instead, 
speaking with such tearful conviction that Crusoe decides not to send 
him away. Defoe’s Friday thus replays the dilemma of Abraham, offering 
himself up as absolute sacrifice to an inscrutable superior (Crusoe) who 
Twentieth-Century Literature
Published by Duke University Press
12
Jay Rajiva
withdraws his command only at the moment when Friday has sacrificed 
by acquiescing of his own accord, without rancor, expecting nothing in 
return. In Foe, this withdrawal cannot occur, as Friday remains unloved 
and therefore—if, as Derrida maintains, one can only sacrifice what one 
loves, or what one truly values—remains unavailable for sacrifice within 
the symbolic order of Christianity.11 The narrative consistently precludes 
sympathy for Friday, rigidly adhering to Barton’s focalization, the colonial 
slant of which renders it epistemically impossible for her to understand 
Friday. We get no sustained intersubjective engagement between Friday 
and Barton, and each attempt to locate meaning in Friday’s actions and 
gestures ends in failure. When Barton provides two sketches of how Friday 
might have lost his tongue, for instance, and asks Friday to indicate which 
of them is true, he merely offers a “vacant” (F 69) stare, forcing her to give 
up the endeavor.  When Barton accompanies his flute-playing and dance 
with music, Friday persists in the same tune that constitutes “no pleasing 
counterpoint” (97), leaving her to wonder, in the end, whether Friday can 
even hear her. The slate that Barton and Foe use to teach Friday to read 
proves useless, as Friday returns the slate to them marked with nothing 
but rows of unblinking eyes, the naked attempt to impose their will on 
the colonized other staring back at them, but without a human frame of 
reference. Friday never speaks, declares his humanity, or enacts a human 
relation to which Barton can ascribe any positive meaning. Friday’s body is 
impenetrable to understanding and, again, to sacrifice, its status as persistent 
non-response a constant source of frustration to Susan Barton: “Oh, Friday, 
how can I make you understand the cravings felt by those of us who live in 
a world of speech to have our questions answered!” (79). In Barton’s many 
attempts to imagine and recreate Friday’s life, his interiority, and his desires, 
repetition becomes an aporia; stripped of structure and reiteration, each 
repetition founders and degenerates into “mere congeries of fragmented 
forms” (Casey 1975, 255). Never answering Barton’s questions, Friday 
remains a being whose negation of the sacrificial secret of Christianity 
means that his death will only ever be a murder, not a sacrifice.
Foe of the Christian heart
That Coetzee’s Crusoe narrative appeared at the height of apartheid 
oppression has informed much of its reception. Understanding Foe as 
deeply engaged with “the powerful silence which is the price of our 
cultural achievements” (2004, 67), Derek Attridge also sees Coetzee as 
having, to some degree, “abused his privileges as a member of the white 
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elite in addressing not the immediate needs of his time but a mystified 
human totality” (71). In sum, Attridge argues that the novel investigates its 
(and Coetzee’s) relation to the literary canon in an attempt to participate 
“in the struggles of those who have been silenced” (72) along lines of race, 
class, and gender. Correspondingly, Kwaku Larbi Korang rejects what he 
perceives as the “romance of an abstract and universal textuality” (1998, 
183) in the figure of Friday. Most polemically, Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1993) 
has charged Coetzee with retreating from the brutal political realities 
of an apartheid system that had already triggered the declaration of the 
State of Emergency. Coetzee’s Friday, Ngugi avers, “has no tongue, no 
voice, no language, and hardly any energy” (1993, 53). By contrast, Jarad 
Zimbler (2004) has emphasized the importance of reading Coetzee in 
the context of the specific publishing history of Foe. As Zimbler notes, 
the Ravan Press edition of Foe, part of a book series funded by the same 
Staffrider magazine whose urban Marxist outlook provided a powerful 
forum for young black writers to chronicle the daily experience of 
apartheid, placed the book squarely alongside explicitly political black 
South African output. In the Ravan Press book blurb, Friday is a “mute 
negro,” the prisoner of an island society of  “stone terraces above bleak 
and empty beaches” whose “rules are strict and simple: survival, industry, 
order. Cruso is master and Friday is slave”; the blurb ominously hints 
of  “battle lines” being drawn between Cruso and Barton, to which the 
“silent Friday” is the only witness (Zimbler 2004, 51).12
 Shifting somewhat from the body of criticism that approaches Foe 
along the axis of direct political engagement, I read the novel as the 
product of an author for whom it was impossible, during the apartheid 
era, “to deny the authority of suffering and therefore of the body” 
(Coetzee 1992a, 248). If we read Coetzee’s novel against Defoe’s, this 
bodily suffering consistently takes place both within a tacitly Christian 
framework and in the context of a disavowed notion of grace that 
dramatizes the author’s own ambivalent relationship to Christian discourse 
(discussed above). Particularly telling is Coetzee’s equivocating remark that 
he is “not a Christian,” or “not yet” (250). The ambivalence of Coetzee’s 
“not yet” is entirely apposite in a discussion of Friday’s place within 
and between projects of Christian conversion: Foe, in this sense, is the 
metafictional “not yet,” the moment before Christianity becomes the 
disavowed heart of the colonial enterprise. 
 For Derrida, the heart is the dwelling-place of secrecy in the 
Christian self. Removed from all exteriority, the secret must be learned 
“by heart” without any “semantic comprehension” (1995, 97): this is the 
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very essence of devotion to God. Thus, Abraham’s willingness to kill his 
son is not a lesson, nor can we incorporate it into a calculus of ethics 
without violating the excess of what that willingness must mean before 
only God, and no other authority. Ethics, expressed as public discourse, 
murders devotion to God, which is before and above all other duties; we 
might even say that by speaking his secret aloud, Abraham would murder 
God. Properly formulated, one’s devotion to God tenders the secret of 
God only to the heart: 
The heart will thus be, in the future, wherever you save real 
treasure, that which is not visible on earth, that whose capital 
accumulates beyond the economy of the terrestrial visible or 
sensible, that is, the corrupted or corruptible economy that is 
vulnerable to moth, rust, and thieves. That does more than imply 
the pricelessness of celestial capital. It is invisible. It doesn’t 
devalue, it can never be stolen from you.     (98)
What the heart contains, then, is invisible, incorporeal, immutable; it 
defies quantification or exchange; it remains impregnable to theft or loss 
of value; it cannot be debased or cheapened by any means because it is 
never intelligible as an exteriority. The heart thus inaugurates the secret 
as paradox: if spirituality is now in-dwelling, secrecy becomes meaningless 
as a signifier, because God, the arbiter of the secret, sees everything, even 
that which one wants to keep secret. The locus of the secret is divinity 
within me, something that is irreducibly secret and unavailable to others, 
yet in order to keep this secret in my heart, I must trace a limit between 
exteriority and God, who by definition can never be reducible to limits. 
But God’s secret resides in me, with my consciousness of him as both 
proof and precondition of the material exterior.
 Tellingly, Derrida’s consideration of the heart turns on a question in 
the form of a repetition: “Where is the heart? What is the heart?” The 
heart is the organ that circulates blood through my body, without which 
I cannot live. Therefore, to speak of displacing my heart is to speak of 
my death in ordinary terms. Yet according to Derrida, the secret heart is 
“subtracted from space” (101): that is, elided from temporality through 
displacement. By transforming into the receptacle of a secret, the heart 
vacates the body. If, however, we were to refuse the transformation of 
the heart into the atemporal keeper of the Christian secret, or defer 
this transplant-as-transformation, we would reveal the presence of the 
operating table, the presence of the surgical scene itself. Such a scene finds 
its literary expression, I argue, in Foe. Despairing of ever teaching Friday 
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to write, Barton wonders how Friday can “be taught to write if there 
are no words within him, in his heart, for writing to reflect, but on the 
contrary only a turmoil of feelings and urges” (F 143). In Friday’s own 
not-yet-Christian heart, she imagines, lies the demon that Christianity 
must incorporate but then disavow. The terror, however, is that Friday’s 
heart refuses such a surreptitious incorporation. While Robinson Crusoe 
presents the Christian subject fully at home with God as “the secret hand 
of Providence” that can “search into the remotest corner of the world, and 
send help to the miserable whenever He [desires]” (RC 210), Foe refuses 
the transplant of the heart, returning us to a textual and historical moment 
prior to the figuration of the heart as the keeper of the Christian mystery. 
We are thrown back into an ethico-spatial instant between worlds that 
exposes the formulation of  Western, imperialist, and Christian ideology. 
This exposure necessarily works through the novels in tandem: Foe can 
stage a critique of Christianity as an ethical framework only through the 
intertextual conversation it invites with the explicit conversion narrative 
of Robinson Crusoe. At the center of that conversation, and of the ethical 
hollowness thus represented in Foe, lies Coetzee’s refusal to accept the 
Christian heart of Defoe’s novel.
 It is true that, though Coetzee’s Friday remains unincorporated into 
the Christian circuit, he cannot retain autonomy within the narrative’s 
framework of social relations. He cannot protect his own body from 
the colonial exercise of power, nor can he achieve any state of being in 
which his subjectivity could find direct expression. Furthermore, making 
the possibility of an epistemic break from colonial logic impossible, and 
perhaps even unethical, risks glorifying the insularity and ethical paralysis 
of the white South African writer. Certainly, such observations are impor-
tant in precluding any valorization of stalled meaning for its own sake, a 
type of post-structuralist euphoria in aporia that conveniently effaces real 
inequalities in representation.13 However, I would argue that while Susan 
Barton may be paralyzed, the novel is not, and this distinction is part of 
what gives Foe its ethical meaning. In reimagining Robinson Crusoe—what 
Attridge refers to as “probably Western culture’s most potent crystallization 
of its concern with the survival of the individual, the fundamentals of 
civilized life, and the dialectic of master and servant” (2004, 70)—Coetzee 
casts the reality of apartheid against that which would rather remain 
secret: the exploitative origins of the imperial project, and the relationship 
between that exploitation and Christianity as a discursive and ethical 
framework. Metafictionally, Coetzee thus addresses how Defoe’s Crusoe 
comes into being in “the time of conversion” (RC 10), exhuming the 
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unacknowledged ethico-spatial moment before Christianity has subsumed 
Platonic responsibility and demonic mystery to itself.
 As metafiction, Foe continuously performs its concern for the validity 
of narrative within a broader context, offering narrative as rehearsal, 
revision, counterfactual, unthought, possibility, and impossibility. It con-
summates its own destruction on every page, anxiously confesses its sins 
to other readers and writers, and destabilizes its own narrative memory, 
even supplanting its narrator with another at the climactic encounter with 
Friday in his own “space.” Finally, it shows author, narrative, and characters 
in a state of becoming, a state anterior to Robinson Crusoe the published 
novel. It does this not merely to take us “behind the scenes,” so to speak, 
in a gesture that would risk reinscribing the hegemony of the author but 
rather to halt us perforce at a historical moment of conversion and contes-
tation. If Robinson Crusoe puts repetition to work to clear the path for what 
cannot bear repetition (God), Foe destabilizes the negotiation of this work 
through exposure of Christianity as a clandestine process of incorporation. 
Susan Barton tells us that she has “a desire to be saved which [she] must 
call immoderate” (F 36), and, later, faced with a godlike Foe who haunts 
her with a woman claiming to be her daughter, Barton sardonically 
remarks that, “in Mr. Foe’s house there are many mansions” (77). As Barton 
draws the comparison between the author and God, Coetzee gestures to 
the unspeakable in Christianity, which Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe will soon 
replace by the a priori “significatory matrix of the imperium” (Marais 1996, 
68), within which the givenness of Christianity will no longer be available 
to critique. The trembling mystery is emerging, being “fathered” within 
the fabric of Coetzee’s novel—an emergence represented in relation to an 
absence, Friday’s missing tongue. When Susan Barton hesitantly inquires 
how Friday lost his tongue, half suspecting Cruso of having cut it out, 
Cruso replies that “Friday lost his tongue before he became mine” (F 
37). Coming on the heels of Barton’s confession that she has a desire to 
be saved, Cruso’s reply is fraught with religious significance. Is it Cruso 
speaking here, or is it the soon-to-be Robinson Crusoe of Defoe’s novel? 
Following this trail, Friday could only ever have become Cruso’s by losing 
his tongue, rendering him the demonic mystery silently constituting the 
spectral limit of the Christian self, a repetition of the demon. Yet this 
discussion between Barton and Cruso is possible only in a discursive 
register that allows its speakers to question God without foreclosure. 
Robinson Crusoe sublates this questioning to an offstage conversion; Foe 
leaves it suspended, without resolution. 
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 The Christian heart is a secret, as Derrida has it, and also the secrecy 
of a secret: the silence that stretches over the demonic and the Platonic, 
the unacknowledged components of Christianity’s trembling mystery. 
We spy the rough draft of Daniel Foe’s work; we peruse the iterations of 
what will become Robinson Crusoe; we witness Friday treated as a beast 
of burden by Cruso and then Barton, whose professed desire “to educate 
him out of darkness and silence” poorly masks her willingness to “use 
words as the shortest way to subject him to [her] will” (F 60); and we 
never hear Friday speak, except at the end of the story, when what we 
hear, “the sounds of the island” (154), overwhelms the parameters of the 
novel’s narrative. In these acts of readership we stumble into a hitherto 
sanctified space, disturbing a secret and thereby exposing the economy 
of sacrifice within which the white colonizer strips the colonized other 
of agency. As I have argued, this exposure is the meta-work that Foe 
steadfastly refuses to abandon, the persistent return to the surgical scene, 
where the newly transplanted heart must now make its primary essence 
the keeping of the originary secret of incorporation, the a priori that casts 
out ethical responsibility to the other. I earlier touched upon Derrida’s 
formulation of the dissymmetry, the rupture in reciprocity that enables the 
Christian subject’s relationship to God. Is it not, therefore, characteristic 
of Coetzee to perform such dissymmetry in the very acts of writing and 
publishing Foe as a white South African during apartheid? What critics 
ask of Coetzee is not what he delivers; and Friday’s story is not what 
Daniel Foe will publish. In both cases, reciprocity is denied. To the extent 
that Foe is a revision of Robinson Crusoe, it is also an acknowledgment 
of Coetzee’s own authorial impotence: in destabilizing Defoe’s textual 
authority, that is, Coetzee cannot help but undermine his own, and the 
literary act of repetition becomes the means of gesturing toward what 
these repetitions conceal. Gilles Deleuze has noted that “if exchange is the 
criterion of generality, theft and gift are those of repetition” (1994, 1). Foe, 
then, is the heart just prior to its reception of the secret of Christianity as 
incorporative process: illuminating an anterior erasure, Coetzee’s theft (the 
Christian colonizer’s theft no longer secret) becomes a gift to the reader. 
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1. Foe will be cited as F.
2. Mrs. Curren in Age of Iron attempts to find redemption for a life of privilege 
in an apartheid system as she dies of cancer; in The Master of Petersburg the 
fictional Dostoevsky, grieving over the death of his stepson, struggles with an 
ethical obligation to “answer to what he does not expect” (Coetzee 1994, 80); 
in Disgrace David Lurie seeks forgiveness from the father of Melanie Isaacs, the 
girl he has raped.
3. Coetzee understands his writing on Tolstoy in these terms, noting that 
since “the basic movement of self-reflexiveness is a doubting and questioning 
movement, it is in the nature of the truth told to itself by the reflecting self not 
to be final” (1992b, 263).
4. See Freud 1939, 102–7. Freud is, however, also focused on how Christian 
doctrine incorporates its excessive other into a religious tradition that must 
deny all traces of such incorporation. As an example, he discusses the ritual of 
communion, which, in its call to Christians to consume and thus incorporate 
the body of Christ, secretly gestures to older rituals of incorporation through 
cannibalization. Freud notes that insofar as Christianity “took over from 
the surrounding peoples numerous symbolic rites, reestablished the great 
mother goddess, and found room for many deities of polytheism in an easily 
recognizable guise” (112), it did not maintain the monotheistic rigor of 
Judaism.
5. Crusoe is the younger brother who eventually acquires wealth and fortune 
in place of his older brother, who is lost (dead). In this, he represents what 
Freud sees as the fate of the younger brother in pre-Christian myths, “who, 
protected by his mother’s love, could profit by his father’s advancing years and 
replace him after his death” (1939, 103). For Freud, the father is of course God, 
with the older brother paralleling the Satanic figure in relation to the younger 
brother as the Christ figure. 
6. Robinson Crusoe will be cited as RC. 
7. See Watt 1957. 
8. Another tendency is to fixate almost exclusively on the trajectory of 
Crusoe’s spiritual journey. Focusing on the parallels between Robinson Crusoe 
and Augustine’s Confessions, Lynne Walhout Hinojosa, for example, confines 
her analysis to Crusoe’s own revelations. Arguing that “the troubled relation 
of Crusoe’s Puritan religion and his secular worldly enterprises has been and 
remains the central quandary of the text” (2012, 644), she declines to extend 
her argument productively to account for Friday’s challenge to what she sees as 
Crusoe’s “flawed theology.”
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9. In this sense, my argument dovetails with Hinojosa’s reading of Crusoe’s 
faulty theology. However, I am less interested in performing an exegetical 
critique of Crusoe’s religious belief than in isolating how this belief dramatizes 
the incorporative process of Christian colonization. In other words, resistant 
elements such as Friday must be sublated, after which the process itself is 
erased, leaving only disavowed traces.
10. Timothy Blackburn links the “simultaneous occurrence of Friday’s birth 
and Crusoe’s arrival on the island” to Defoe’s insistence on “God’s constant 
role in human life” (1985, 368).
11. Similarly, Giorgio Agamben defines homo sacer as one whose “entire 
existence is reduced to a bare life stripped of every right by virtue of the fact 
that anyone can kill him without committing homicide” (1998, 183).
12. Zimbler (2004) draws a contrast between the Ravan Press blurb, with its 
Secker and Warburg British analog that made a point of comparing Coetzee 
to European authors such as George Orwell and Umberto Eco, and the later 
Penguin edition of Foe, which focused on Susan Barton’s “missing” narrative as 
a feminist project of reclamation. 
13. Benita Parry offers an eloquent critique of what she perceives as Coetzee’s 
fascination “with the euphoria of desire unmediated by words,” which 
discursively eliminates any inquiry into “how deprivation inflicts silence on 
those who are homeless in a hierarchical social world” (1996, 48, 46).
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